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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY 
COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
WILLCO ASSOCIATES, J 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
i Case No. 860324 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
WILLCO ASSOCIATES 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court commit reversible error in 
refusing to hold, as a matter of law, that an accord and 
satisfaction had been reached between plaintiff Masonry 
Equipment & Supply Company ("MESCO") and defendant Willco 
Associates, Inc., ("Willco")? 
2. Was the claimed accord and satisfaction between 
MESCO and Willco supported by consideration? 
3. By cashing Willco's paid-in-full check, did MESCO 
assent to the terms of the accord and satisfaction? 
4. Was MESCO's claim against Willco for damages 
unliquidated at the time Willco tendered its check as payment 
in full? 
5. Were the additional repair charges claimed by 
MESCO disputed by the parties in good faith? 
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6. Did Willco surrender a legally enforceable right 
in entering into the accord and satisfaction with MESCO? 
7. Was the lower court's finding that there was no 
offsetting downtime suffered by Willco supported by sufficient 
evidence? 
8. Did the trial court commit error in refusing to 
dismiss MESCO's complaint for failure to give the required 
written notice to Willco? 
9. Is MESCO entitled to prejudgment interest at 12 
percent per annum? 
10. Was the court's ruling that MESCO is entitled to 
judgment against Willco in the amount of $8,626.82 supported by 
sufficient evidence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered by the court on May 8, 1986, and 
from the Judgment docketed on May 9, 1986, by the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick presiding. The judgment against Willco is for 
the principal sum of $8,626.82, together with interest, costs, 
and attorneys' fees. 
-?-
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B- Disposition of the Case Below 
The action was commenced by MESCO on December 3, 
1982. (R. 2.) Willco filed its Answer on April 4, 1983. (R. 
5.) The case came on for trial before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick on March 5, 1986. The court made its ruling from the 
bench following the trial. (Tr. 164.) The court entered its 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law (R. 136), over Willco's 
objections (R. 102.) and the Judgment was docketed on May 5, 
1986. (R. 141.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This is a suit on a contract for damages allegedly 
caused to a LC-30 Gerlinger crawler that was rented by Willco 
Associates, Inc., ("Willco") from Plaintiff Masonry Equipment & 
Supply Company (MMESC0,f). 
Willco is a licensed contractor and does business as a 
horizontal boring and tunneling contractor. Willco rented the 
machine from MESCO commencing on December 11, 1981, intending 
to use the machine in connection with a contract that Willco 
had with Kennecott Corporation by which Willco was to bore a 
seven foot diameter tunnel underneath a railroad track and 
insert a pipeline. The terms of the rental of the machine by 
Willco were negotiated between Frank Willden, Willco's 
president, and Lonnie Teaman, an employee of MESCO. Mr. 
Villden explained to Mr. Yeaman the purposes for which Willco 
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needed the machine. Mr. Yeaman represented that the Gerlinger 
Crawler would serve all of Willco's needs in connection with 
the Kennecott job. (Tr. 141.) 
During the time that Willco used the Gerlinger Crawler 
on the Kennecott job, Willco experienced significant 
difficulties and problems with the machine, which caused Willco 
to lose approximately 80 hours down time, during which its 
equipment and employees were idle. (Tr. 80, 129, 141-58.) Mr. 
Willden testified, that based on his experience in the heavy 
equipment industry, the machine was too heavy for the type of 
pad used on the tracks. (Tr. 141-42.) As a consequence, the 
pads continually broke off of the machine and had to be welded 
back on. Also, the machine had problems starting, caused by a 
short in the battery. (Tr. 143.) Further, the catalytic 
converter was too small for the machine and melted. (Tr. 56.) 
MESCO made a number of service calls to the Kennecott job to 
work on the machine. Willco was not charged for these calls. 
(Tr. 32, 149-50.) Willco incurred damages of $10,630 as a 
result of the problems caused by the machine. (Tr. 148-49.) 
The first rental agreement (Exhibit 1) was signed by 
Willco, and provided that the period of the rental would be 
four months. Willco returned the machine on March 30, 1982. 
When the machine was returned, MESCO inspected it and claimed 
the machine was damaged. MESCO told Willco at that time that 
-4-
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it would be charged for the additional repairs. The final 
rental agreement signed by Willco dated March 11, 1982, 
(Exhibit 3) provided: "Repairs to be made will be billed out 
on separate invoice." MESCO gave to Willco Repair Order No. 
1426, dated March 2, 1982, (Exhibit 9) charging Willco the sum 
of $2,390.06 for repairs to the machine for track and for a 
catalytic converter. 
After receiving Repair Order No. 1426, Frank Willden 
had at least two conversations with Matthew Lyman, an officer 
of MESCO, in which Mr. Willden disputed that Willco was 
responsible for the damages claimed on Repair Order No. 1426 or 
for any other damages MESCO claimed had been caused to the 
machine. (Tr. 57-58, 75-76, 128-33, 153-54.) Mr. Willden 
testified that in his second conversation with Matt Lyman, he 
agreed that Willco would pay the $2,390 indicated on Repair 
Order No. 1426 so long as MESCO agreed to accept that payment 
as payment in full for all charges that MESCO claimed that 
Willco owed, including charges on Repair Order 1426 and any 
other charges or damage to the machine. Id. Matthew Lyman 
testified at trial that he could not remember one way or the 
r 
other whether such a conversation occurred. He did not deny 
that he had had such a conversation with Mr. Willden. (Tr. 94, 
99.5 
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At the time Mr. Willden had the two conversations with 
Matthew Lyman regarding Repair Order No. 1426, Mr. Willden told 
Mr. Lyman that MESCO should reimburse him for his damages 
caused because the machine had caused so many problems and had 
not functioned in accordance with the representations and 
warranties made by Lonnie Yeaman, MESCO's employee. Frank 
Willden and Matthew Lyman agreed that on payment by Willco of 
the amount indicated on Repair Order No. 1426, Willco would 
release all its claims against MESCO for down time and MESCO 
would release all its claims against Willco for further damages 
to the machine. (Tr. 129-32.) 
Following the second conversation with Matthew Lyman, 
Willco tendered its check (Exhibit 7) to MESCO in the amount of 
$2,390, dated October 4, 1982. The check was tendered as 
payment in full of Willco's entire account with MESCO, and 
stated on the back: 
Endorsement of this check constitutes payment in 
full of your account #: 2224 Willco Assoc. 
2224 was the account number assigned by MESCO to Willco. (Tr. 
93.) MESCO accepted and cashed the check. 
Approximately three weeks after the check was cashed, 
MESCO disassembled the machine and inspected it. (Tr. 103, 
108-09.) MESCO thereafter prepared Repair Order No. 1656 
(Exhibit 4) which described damages totally in the amount of 
-£- i 
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$8,626.82. (Tr. 108.) The machine was never actually 
repaired. (Tr. 113.) Farrell Lewis, an employee of MESCO, 
testified that the charges used on the Repair Order came from 
the manufacturer's suggested price list. (Tr. 103.) Exhibit 4 
was admitted into evidence over Willco's objection. (Tr. 
106-07.) Prior to Repair Order No. 1656, Willco had never been 
advised about the amount of damages claimed by MESCO. 
After receiving Repair Order No. 1656, Willco refused 
to pay on the grounds that MESCO had cashed its check, which 
Willco had tendered as payment in full of its whole account. 
Willco further denied liability for any of the repairs 
indicated on the Repair Order. This suit followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Willco and MESCO reached an accord and 
satisfaction. In conversations following the return of the 
machine, the parties agreed that if Willco would make payment 
on Repair Order No. 1426, MESCO would drop its claims for any 
additional damage to the machine. Willco, in turn, agreed to 
drop its claims against MESCO for damages it incurred because 
the machine did not work properly or as represented. Willco 
tendered its check for $2,390 with a statement on the back that 
endorsement would constitute payment in full of Willco's entire 
account. The check was accepted and cashed. At the time the 
check was tendered, the amount of damages to the machine was 
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unliquidated and disputed. The accord and satisfaction claimed 
by Willco was supported by consideration. 
2. The evidence was uncontoverted that Willco 
incurred damage as a result of down time on the Kennecott job 
incurred because the machine did not work properly or as 
represented. The testimony was undisputed that the value of 
the down time was $10,630.00. 
3. MESCO was not entitled to maintain its action 
againt Willco because it failed to give written notice to 
Willco as required by the Rental Agreement. 
4. MESCO is not entitled to prejudgment interest at 
the rate of 12 percent per annum. The statutory prejudgment 
interest rate is 10 percent per annum. 
5. The trial court's holding that MESCO was entitled 
to judgment against Willco in the amount of $8,626.82 was 
unsupported by sufficient evidence. MESCO disassembled the 
machine after it was returned by Willco in order to determine 
what damage had been caused. There was no evidence that MESCO 
had done a similar type of inspection prior to Willco's taking 
possession of the machine. There was no evidence that the 
damage to the machine was caused while it was in the possession 
of Willco. Further, Repair Order 1656 (Exhibit 4), which sets 
forth the damage amount claimed by MESCO was admitted 
improperly because it was without foundation and constituted 
hearsay. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
MESCO AND WILLCO 
REACHED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
A. Elements of an Accord and Satisfaction. 
Willco tendered its check for $2,390 (Exhibit 7) to 
MESCO as payment in full of all amounts that it may have owed 
to plaintiff. In Finding of Fact No. 8, the lower court found: 
That the defendant submitted to the plaintiff a 
check with restrictive endorsements claiming full 
settlement and claiming an oral accord and 
satisfaction, which check was cashed by plaintiff. 
(R. 137.) The check was tendered, not as payment only of 
Repair Order No. 1426, but as satisfaction of Willco's entire 
account with MESCO. By endorsing and cashing the check with 
the condition on the back, MESCO entered into an accord and 
satisfaction with Willco that discharged any further liability. 
This Court stated the elements of an accord and 
satisfaction in the context of a "paid in full" check in Marton 
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985). There, as 
here, the defendant had tendered a check as payment in full of 
the entire contract. The defendant conceded that the amount of 
the check, $5,000, was due and owing to the plaintiff. This 
Court held that the general rule applied "that an accord and 
satisfaction of a single claim is not avoided merely because 
the amount paid and accepted is only that which the debtor 
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conceded to be due." Id- at 609 (emphasis added). The Court 
held that an accord and satisfaction had been reached, stating 
the elements as follows: 
An accord and satisfaction requires that there be 
an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over 
the amount due. . . . Payment must be tendered in 
full settlement of the entire dispute and not in 
satisfaction of a separate undisputed obligation 
• . . . However, when a bona fide dispute arises 
(the existence of which Marton does not dispute 
in this appeal) and a check is tendered in full 
payment of an unliquidated claim as we have here, 
arising out of a "time and materials" contract, 
the creditor may not disregard the condition 
attached. 
Id. at 609 (citations omitted). 
In describing the elements of an accord and 
satisfaction in Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1369 (Utah 1980), this Court indicated that consideration need 
be given for the accord. The Court stated: 
Where the underlying claim is disputed or 
uncertain ("unliquidated"), the obligor's assent 
to the definite statement of performance in the 
accord amounts to sufficient consideration, as it 
constitutes a surrender of the right to dispute 
the initial obligation. 
. . . In such cases, consideration is often 
found in the obligor's agreement to alter the 
means or method of payment of the obligation 
initially owed, or to surrender the assertion of 
a legally enforceable right. 
Id. at 1372 (citations omitted). See. 15 S. Williston, 
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1854, at 542 (3d ed. 
1972) (A creditor who has received a check tendered as full 
-10-
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satisfaction of a claim that is unliquidated or disputed in 
good faith must accept it as such or return it); Ralph A. 
Badger & Co. v. Fidelity BuildinR & Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97, 75 
P.2d 669, 676 (1938) ("Settlement of an unliquidated or 
disputed claim where the parties are apart in good faith 
presents such consideration"); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 
39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935) ("Before there can be an accord and 
satisfaction by acceptance of a less sum than claimed, there 
must be an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute as to the 
amount thereof.") 
Thus, there was consideration for the accord and 
satisfaction between Willco and MESCO in the present case if 
the claim being settled by payment of Willco's $2,390.00 check 
was either unliquidated or disputed in good faith, or, as the 
Court noted in Sugarhouse Finance, if Willco had agreed to 
surrender a legally enforceable right. 610 P.2d at 1372. 
B. Payment of an undisputed portion of an unliquidated 
claim constitutes consideration. 
Although Willco disputed that it owed anything to 
MESCO, it offered to settle for $2,390, which was the amount of 
Repair Order No. 1426 (Exhibit 9). In Finding of Fact No. 15, 
the lower court found that there was no separate consideration 
for the claimed accord and satisfaction (R. 138). In Finding 
No. 10, the lower court stated further: "The Court does not 
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find that the defendant did anything more than the defendant 
was obligated to do as he paid the balance due and owing on 
that invoice." (R. 137.) These two findings are in error as a 
matter of law. The trial court apparently believed that if 
Willco did in fact owe the amount paid by the check, that it 
could not constitute consideration for an accord and 
satisfaction. Even if the amount of Repair order No. 1426 was 
legitimately owed by Willco, that there was consideration since 
the check was tendered as satisfaction of Willco's entire MESCO 
account, which was unliquidated when the check was tendered. 
The court should have held that consideration was sufficient 
even if only part of the account was disputed. Professor 
Williston states: 
Not infrequently, though a claim is unliquidated 
or the subject of a bona fide and reasonable 
dispute, it is conceded that at least a certain 
amount is due. While it would appear that in 
paying this conceded part of the claim, the 
debtor was merely doing what he was previously 
bound to do, the law looks upon an unliquidated 
or disputed claim as a whole and does not 
attempt to set a value upon it, or to define the 
extent of the debtor's legal obligation. 
Accordingly, such a claim is dealt with as a 
chattel is dealt with, as something the adequacy 
of which as consideration will not be measured. 
By the weight of authority, the payment of the 
amount admittedly due will support a promise to 
discharge the whole claim. 
1 S. Williston, supra § 129, at 528 (citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
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In Marton Remodeling this Court held that the parties 
had reached an accord and satisfaction where the defendant had 
paid only what it conceded was due. The Court stated the rule 
that "an accord and satisfaction of a single claim is not 
avoided merely because the amount paid and accepted is only 
that which the debtor concedes to be due." 706 P.2d at 609 
(emphasis added). The Marton Remodeling opinion cited the 
case of Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 
1983), in which the Alaska Supreme Court, faced with a similar 
issue, held: 
Although the record would permit an inference 
supporting the ABL claim that Keystone paid only 
that part of the debt which was undisputed, a 
majority of the cases considering this issue hold 
that a valid accord and satisfaction nevertheless 
exists. . . • The authorities conclude that the 
entire claim, including both the disputed and 
undisputed elements, is unitary and not subject 
to division so long as the whole claim is 
unliquidated. . . . AVL's entire claim was 
unliquidated. Keystone's obligation to pay a 
part of AVL's invoice, even if conceded, did not 
serve to render the conceded amount liquidated. 
We are persuaded to adopt the majority rule 
and hold that Keystone's conditional offer to pay 
only the undisputed part of the unliquidated debt 
in full satisfaction of that debt was supported 
by consideration. 
Id, at 778 (emphasis added; citations omitted.) The Utah 
Supreme Court relied on the above-quoted statement from the Air 
Van Lines decision in Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609. 
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Thus, even though the trial court believed that Willco 
did in fact owe the $2,390.06, as indicated on Repair Order No. 
1426, because the check was tendered as payment in full of the 
entire account, which was unliquidated and disputed, the court 
committed error in holding that the accord and satisfaction was 
not supported by consideration. 
The evidence at trial was undisputed that MESCO had 
knowledge of the damage to the machine when the machine was 
returned on March 30, 1982. Willco submitted its check in 
satisfaction of its entire amount. The back of the check 
recited that endorsement would constitute "payment in full on 
your account #: 2224 Willco Assoc." (Exhibit 7.) 2224 was the 
number assigned by MESCO to Willco's entire account. Willco 
does not dispute the lower court's Finding No. 8 that the check 
was tendered as "full settlement." MESCO accepted the check 
knowing that, although it was payment of Repair Order No. 1426 
(Exhibit 9), it was tendered as payment in full of Willco's 
entire account with MESCO, which included claims for damage to 
the machine. 
C. By cashing Willco's paid-in-full check, MESCO 
assented to the terms of the accord and satisfaction. 
This Court's Sugarhouse Finance opinion specifies 
that there must be "an assent or meeting of the minds of the 
parties" in order to have an accord and satisfaction. 610 P.2d 
at 1372. 
-1A-
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Frank Willden testified for Willco that he had two 
conversations with Matthew Lyman regarding the damage claimed 
by MESCO. Mr. Lyman was an officer of MESCO at the time. (Tr. 
34, 81.) Mr. Willden testified that he and Mr. Lyman reached 
an agreement that MESCO would accept payment of Repair Order 
No. 1426 (Exhibit 9) as satisfaction of Willco's entire 
account, including damages that MESCO claimed Willco caused to 
the machine. Regarding those two conversations, Mr. Willden 
testified: 
Q First of all, can you tell me with whom 
you spoke concerning these charges? 
A I spoke with Matt Lyman. I spoke to 
someone else when I wrote the check out, but I 
don't remember who. 
Q How many conversations did you have 
with Matt Lyman specifically about that 
particular charge and whether it was owed or not? 
A Two definitely, maybe another one. 
Q When was the first one? 
A The first one would have been when I 
saw this work order, probably sometime in March 
or probably April, probably in April. 
Q Was it after the machine had been 
returned? 
A I'm pretty sure it was. 
Q Can you tell us then what was said by 
yourself and what was said by Mr. Lyman? This 
was on the telephone, wasn't it? 
A Yes, it was. 
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Q You just tell us what was said between 
the two of you then. 
A I told him I didn't feel we owed it, 
the reason being that the catalytic converter had 
melted down which was not my fault, and that the 
tracks, I didn't feel the tracks had to be 
replaced. 
Their own mechanic had told me, just weld 
plates on. So they should have been able to just 
weld the plates on and repair it that way. 
That's what they told me to do to make the 
machine go. He told me that it was a new 
machine, and nobody else had had those problems, 
and that he figured that I had done the damage, 
that I had damaged it. 
Q Did he say anything about what kind of 
damage? 
A He said the whole undercarriage was 
torn up. 
Q What did you say about that? 
A I told him I did not agree with that. 
Q Did you say why? 
A Well, yes, I told him we had been using 
the machine, we used it right up until the day we 
turned it in. We drove it on the truck to return 
it in. It was running as well as it had ever 
run, and I told him that he had no right to 
charge us for something that was his fault. 
Also, you know, we discussed who was going 
to pay for my down time, because I had lost a lot 
of time, and I needed to be on other jobs. I was 
paying rental and expenses. 
Q What did you say to him about the down 
time? 
A I asked him if he would pay for it. 
-i A . 
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Q What else did you say to him about that? 
A I told him that we had been shut down 
at least 80 hours. I remember that figure, 
because I had had -- I was concerned about it. 
Q Did you tell him why you had been shut 
down for at least 80 hours? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What did you say? 
A Almost every morning the machine would 
not start. There was something wrong in the 
wiring, somewhere that the battery would 
continuously run down. They replaced the 
starter, but it still would not start, and the 
tracks kept falling off. Every day, just about, 
we had to weld three plates back on the tracks. 
Q Was there anything else that you and he 
discussed in that first conversation? 
A Well, we discussed the actual quality 
of the machine. I didn't feel it was a very good 
machine. I considered, which I told him --
Mr. Fullmer: I object to that, your Honor, 
as to what he feels the quality was. He's the 
one that rented the machine, and he's the one who 
was using it. 
The Court: He's relating, as I 
understand it, Mr. Fullmer, what he said in the 
conversation. Overruled. 
The Witness: I told him that I actually 
would consider getting another machine. When I 
originally looked at this, my intention was to 
keep the machine. 
The Court: Well, just a minute. Limit 
your testimony to the question. That is, what 
was said in the conversation, not all of your 
feelings out of the conversation. What was said 
in the conversation. 
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Q (By Mr. Marshall) Was there anything 
else in that first conversation with Matthew 
Lyman then? 
A That's mostly what I recall. 
Q When was the second conversation you 
recall? 
A It was sometime later. It was quite a 
qhile [sic] later. 
Q Can you remember approximately when? 
A It would have probably been in three or 
four months later, July or August. 
Q Again, was this on the telephone? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Tell the court what was said in that 
telephone conversation. 
A In that telephone conversation, he 
again --he had called and asked for payment or 
asked me to call him back, which I had returned 
his call, and he wanted to know when I was going 
to pay it, and I told him that I didn't feel we 
owed it. 
Q This is the $2390? 
A This is the 2300. In the first 
conversation, he had also said that there was a 
lot of damage done on the undercarriage, and we 
discussed this damage on the undercarriage. 
Again, he says, it's strange that you are the 
only one that's had this problem. He said, you 
are -- nobody else had this problem. 
I said, I can't help it. The machine is too 
light, and that's why I'm not going to buy it. I 
told him I would pay him $2390 and nothing else, 
that would be for everything that Willco had that 
we had rented from him, any damages, anything, 
but on the same token, I didn't want any other 
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charges come in, because even if we did damage 
the machine, that we had $8,000, $9,000 worth of 
down time that they should pay us. He agreed to 
accept the $2390. 
Q What did he say? 
A He told me, he says, if you will pay me 
the $2390, he says, we will call it even. He 
says, that will be fair. 
Q Did you say anything to him about the 
kind of check you were going to write to MESCO? 
A I told him that, you know, we would put 
pain [sic] in full on the check. 
Q What did he say? 
A He said, that's fine. I think his 
exact words is, I see no problem with that. 
Q What position did you understand Matt 
Lyman to have at the time you had those 
conversations? 
A I don't know how I knew it. I always 
had the understanding that he was one of the 
owners. 
(Tr. 127-33.) See also Tr. 57-62, 74-75, 153-54. 
Mr. Willden further testified that before he sent the 
check to MESCO he called and asked for Matt Lyman, who was not 
there. He then spoke with someone else and said that Willco 
was sending in the check and that he was going to put the 
statement on the back that endorsement would constitute payment 
in full. (Tr. 133-34.) He sent the check in, which MESCO 
endorsed and cashed. 
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At trial, Mr. Lyman testified that he could not 
remember one way or the other having such a conversation with 
Mr. Willden regarding the charges or the settlement with 
Willco. (Tr. 94.) He also could not remember any conversation 
regarding Willco's sending a paid in full check. (Tr. 95.) 
Mr. Lyman did not deny that the conversations occurred. He 
only testified he couldn't remember. (Tr. 94, 95, 99.) He 
testified that he could not even remember conversations with 
Willco that he made handwritten notations about on the aging 
analyses (Exhibit 10). (Tr. 96.) 
The lower court made no finding about whether the 
conversations between Frank Willden and Matthew Lyman 
occurred. Mr. Willden's testimony was uncontroverted and 
constituted ample evidence of an agreement between Willco and 
MESCO that the check would constitute payment in full. The 
lower court did find that Willco tendered the check "claiming 
full settlement and claiming an oral accord and satisfaction." 
(R. 137.) Thus, the court plainly found that when Willco 
submitted the check, it believed that an oral accord and 
satisfaction had been reached with MESCO. 
Even if the lower court had found that Matthew Lyman 
did not assent to the accord and satisfaction on behalf of 
MESCO, as a matter of law the court should have implied an 
assent on the grounds that MESCO accepted and cashed Willco's 
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check which was tendered as payment in full. This rule was 
summarized as follows by Professor Williston: 
If the parties are dealing orally with one 
another and the debtor offers the creditor a 
check in full satisfaction which the creditor 
takes, it must be inferred that he assents to 
the terms. 
So if the debtor laid down the check and 
departed, saying, "If this is taken, it is full 
satisfaction/1 (and similarly if the debtor 
sends the check with a like notice), and the 
creditor takes it, saying nothing, his taking 
will be equivalent to an expression of assent to 
the offer, whatever his mental intent. 
If he shows by some act or word, not brought 
home to the debtor at the time that he takes the 
check, that his intention is not to treat the 
debt as satisfied, he should still be regarded as 
assenting to the terms of the debtor's offer, for 
under the circumstances the debtor has reason to 
suppose that the taking of the check is a 
manifestation of assent. 
15 S. Williston, supra § 1855, at 549, 51 (citation omitted; 
emphasis added). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281 
comment d (1981) (Acceptance by creditor of a paid in full 
check, where there is consideration, may form the basis of an 
enforceable accord). 
Consistent with this rule, courts have thus held that 
a creditor who accepts a check marked "payment in full" does so 
at his own risk. In Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 
(Utah 1985), this Court held that there was an accord and 
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satisfaction where the defendant tendered a paid-in-full check 
for the undisputed amount even though the creditor marked "not 
full payment" on the check. The Court stated: 
It is of no legal consequence that Marton told 
Jensen upon receipt of the $5,000 check that he 
did not regard it as payment in full. Marton 
could not disregard with immunity the condition 
placed on the check by Jensen by writing "not 
full payment" under the condition. 
706 P.2d at 609. See Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 
774, 778 (Alaska (1983) ("AVL had the option either to tear up 
the check and sue for what it felt was due or to cash the check 
and consider the contract dispute resolved. When it cashed the 
check it effectively accepted Keystone's offer to compromise 
and satisfy the debt"). 
In the present case, MESCO accepted and cashed 
Willco's check which was tendered as full settlement, according 
to Finding of Fact No. 8. (R. 137.) That finding by itself 
contains all of the elements of an accord and satisfaction, and 
the lower court erred in not so finding. The necessary assent 
should be implied where MESCO accepted the check tendered as 
payment in full. Even if MESCO had written "not full payment" 
or "endorsed under protest" on the check, it would still be 
held to have assented, as shown by the Martin Remodeling case. 
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D. MESCO's claim against Willco was unliquidated at the 
time the check was tendered as payment in full. 
Although the lower court did not make any finding 
regarding whether the debt sued on by MESCO was unliquidated, 
the evidence was uncontroverted that it was. Because Willco's 
alleged debt to MESCO was unliquidated at the time the check 
was tendered, the lower court committed error in not holding 
that there was a valid accord and satisfaction supported by 
consideration. 
According to this Court's Marton Remodeling opinion, 
"[a]n accord and satisfaction requires that there be an 
unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute over the amount due." 
706 P.2d at 609. In Sugarhouse Finance, this Court used the 
term "uncertain" in defining what was meant by "unliquidated." 
610 P.2d at 1372. The evidence was clear that if anything was 
uncertain, it was the total cost of the repairs to the machine, 
which was not calculated until after MESCO had received and 
cashed Willco's check. Farrell Lewis testified that he did not 
prepare Exhibit 4 until October 28, 1982, when the machine was 
disassembled. (Tr. 102, 108-09.) Willco's check was received 
and cashed on or about October 4, 1982. (Exhibit 7.) 
Professor Williston elaborated on what constitutes an 
unliquidated account, noting that M[a]n unliquidated claim is 
one, the amount of which has not been fixed by agreement or 
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cannot be exactly determined by the application of rules of 
arithmatic or of law.M 1 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law 
of Contracts § 128, at 526 (3d ed. 1957). It has been further 
stated: 
A claim is "unliquidated," within the meaning of 
the rule relating to partial payment, or payment 
of a less amount than is claimed, as an accord 
and satisfaction, where the creditor would be 
compelled, but for the settlement, to bear some 
further burden in order to have the amount of the 
claim so fixed or established that the debtor 
would be bound thereby. Thus, a claim is 
unliquidated, even if it appears that something 
is due . . . . 
1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 47, at 528-29 (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, in Sharpe v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance 
Co., 62 N.C. App. 564, 302 S.E.2d 893 (1983), the court held 
that a claim for insurance coverage for damages from a fire was 
unliquidated where the actual cash value of the items destroyed 
"could not be resolved by a predetermined mathematical formula, 
and it was not agreed prior to the date of loss." Id. at 
894, Similarly, a claim is unliquidated where the amount 
"could only be established by a jury." Georgia Ports 
Authority v. Mitsubishi International Corp., 156 Ga. App. 304, 
274 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1980). An unliquidated claim "is one 
which one of the parties to the contract or transaction cannot 
alone render certain." Marathon Oil Co. v. Hollis, 167 Ga. 
App- 48, 305 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1983). 
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Professor McCormick defined an unliquidated claim as 
follows: 
A claim is liquidated if the evidence 
furnishes data which, if believed, makes it 
possible to compute the amount with exactness, 
without reliance upon opinion or discretion. 
Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed 
sum, claims for money had and received, claims 
for money paid out, and claims for goods or 
services to be paid for at an agreed rate. 
C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 54, at 213 
(1935). See Freemont National Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Collateral Control Corporation, 724 F.2d 1410, 1415 (8th Cir. 
1983) (A claim is liquidated if it is fixed and determined or 
if it is readily determinable by computation or by reference to 
a recognized standard"); Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 
236 So. 2d 154, 157 (1970) ("A claim for debt or damages is 
held to be liquidated in character if the amount thereof is 
fixed, has been agreed upon, or is capable of ascertainment by 
mathematical computation or operation of law"); Hallett 
Construction Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 
520, 139 N.W.2d 421, 426 (1966) ("A demand is not liquidated, 
even if it appears that something is due unless it appears how 
much is due"); Westamerica Securities, Inc. v. Cornelius, 214 
Kan. 301, 520 P.2d 1262, 1270 (1974) ("A claim becomes 
liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is 
due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely 
ascertainable by mathematical computation"). 
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The evidence in the present case was undisputed that 
MESCO's claim against Willco for repairs to the crawler was 
unliquidated at the time Willco tendered the payment in full 
check. MESCO did not send Willco the repair order for the 
additional repair charges until after Willco's check had been 
received and cashed- Willco tendered the check not just as 
payment of Repair Order No. 1426, but as payment in full of its 
entire MESCO account, No. 2224. At the time the check was 
tendered, the claim for additional repairs was unknown and 
uncertain. Being thus unliquidated, the accord and 
satisfaction was supported by consideration and must be upheld. 
E. The claim for additional repair charges was disputed 
by the parties in good faith. 
According to Marton Remodeling, an accord and 
satisfaction will also be supported by consideration if there 
is a "bona fide dispute over the amount due." 706 P.2d at 
609. Thus, consideration for the accord and satisfaction 
claimed by Willco will also be found if the additional repair 
charges were disputed in good faith. It is not necessary that 
the court to find that Willco's dispute with MESCO over the 
charges was meritorious, so long as the dispute was made 
honestly and in good faith. The Supreme Court of Utah stated 
in Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073 (1935), that 
there will be consideration for an accord and satisfaction 
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where there was Ma bona fide dispute as to the amount thereof. 
It is not necessary for the claim to be well founded, but it 
must be made in good faith." Id. at 1076 (emphasis added.) 
In its decision in Marton Remodeling this Court 
relied on the Alaska decision of Air Van Lines, Inc. v. 
Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983), citing it four times. 
With respect to the issue whether there was a bona fide dispute 
sufficient to support the accord and satisfaction, the Alaska 
court stated: 
For AVL [the creditor] to avoid summary judgment 
on the issue of whether the accord was supported 
by adequate consideration, it would have to 
establish either bad faith or the absence of a 
bona fide dispute. AVL could not establish 
Keystone's [the debtor] bad faith simply by 
showing that a jury might have found in its 
favor on the overtime claim. In the absence of 
some direct evidence of bad faith, AVL must 
establish that at the time it ignored the 
restrictive endorsement and cashed the check no 
bona fide dispute existed as a matter of law. 
Because reasonable people couple differ on the 
issue of whether Keystone's conduct constituted 
implied authorization to pay overtime, there was 
a bona fide dispute on this issue as a matter of 
law. We therefore hold that AVL negotiated the 
full payment check at its peril. 
Id. at 778 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
It has also been stated: 
It is not material which of the parties is 
right in his contention, or that either or both 
are mistaken; it also makes no difference whether 
the dispute arises over, or involves, a question 
of fact or one of law. Furthermore, it is not 
necessary that the contention of either party be 
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well founded in fact or in law, or rest upon 
sound reasons, or that the matter be really 
doubtful, for the court will not inquire into the 
merits of the dispute, so long as it is founded 
on some reasonably tenable or plausible grounds. 
Basically, it is sufficient if the parties 
honestly believe in the correctness of their 
respective positions, and assert their claims in 
good faith, or consider the matter so far 
doubtful as to make it the subject of a mutual 
adjustment or settlement; even a full knowledge 
of all the facts is not a prerequisite to the 
existence of a good faith controversy. 
1 C.J.S Accord and Satisfaction § 46, at 526-27 (1985) 
(citations omitted emphasis added). See 1 S. Williston, 
supra, § 128, at 526 (3d ed. 1957) ("The surrender of a 
disputed claim, whether unliquidated or liquidated, if the 
dispute is honest and not obviously frivolous, is consideration 
which the law will not attempt to evaluate.") 
The testimony of Frank Willden at trial was 
uncontroverted that he disputed with MESCO both liability for 
and the amount of the additional repair charges contained on 
Repair Order No. 1426, and for any other damage MESCO claimed. 
(Tr. 57-58, 75-76, 128-33, 153-54.) MESCO's president, Del 
Lewis, testified that he had had a conversation with Frank 
Willden in which Mr. Willden stated ,fthat he didn't feel that 
he was responsible for the damages." (Tr. 20.) Mr. Willden 
testified that Willco had had difficulties with the crawler 
that resulted in approximately 80 hours of downtime. (Tr. 
-9ft-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
143.) He testified further that, based on his experience, the 
machine was too heavy for its undercarriage and that the pads 
on the tracks were too thin. (Tr. 142.) Willco's dispute was 
in good faith. Mr. Willden testified that because of the 
problems Willco had with the machine on the Kennecott job, 
Willco lost approximately 80 hours. The machine has 
substantial problems with its starter (Tr. 143), with the 
catalytic converter (Tr. 56), and with the tracks, which kept 
falling off, (Tr. 142.). Mr. Willden testified at some length 
regarding the problems Willco had on the job, (Tr. 143-49, 
161-62), which caused damages in the amount of $10,630. (Tr. 
148-49.) The damages incurred by Willco were in breach of 
specific warranties made by MESCO that the machine would be 
suitable for Willco to use on the Kennecott job. (Tr. 141.) 
Mr. Willden testified that Willco would not have rented the 
machine had he known how the machine would actually operate. 
(Tr. 141.) MESCO'S president, Del Lewis, testified that the 
was aware of the problems with the starter and with the 
plates. (Tr. 33-34.) Frank Willden testified that MESCO made 
some service calls to repair the machine on the job for which 
Willco was not charged. (Tr. 149-50.) Del Lewis also 
testified that he knew of six or seven service calls made by 
HESCO employees to the Kennecott job for which Willco was not 
charged. (Tr. 32-33.) 
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The evidence was uncontroverted that Willco disputed 
the repair charges in good faith. That fact, by itself, was 
sufficient to constitute consideration for the accord and 
satisfaction. The lower court committed reversible error in 
not so holding. 
F. Willco surrendered a legally enforceable right. 
According to the Sugarhouse Finance case, an accord 
and satisfaction will also be supported by consideration if the 
debtor has surrendered a legally enforceable right. 610 P.2d 
at 1372. The evidence in the present case was undisputed that 
Willco agreed to surrender its claims against MESCO for breach 
of contract and warranty if MESCO would accept the $2,390 check 
as payment in full. MESCO did not rebut Frank Willden's 
testimony that the crawler did not work as had been represented 
by MESCO (Tr. 141) and that Willco suffered over $10,630 in 
damages as a result of the delay. (Tr. 148-49.) The 
relinquishment of its claim for those damages by Willco also 
constituted valid consideration for the accord and 
satisfaction. The trial court held that Willco "failed to 
prove any offsetting down time." (R. 138.) this finding was 
contrary to the undisputed evidence concerning the difficulties 
that Willco suffered because the machine didn't work. 
. ^ n. 
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G. The policy of the law favors the finding of an accord 
and satisfaction. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court in the Sugarhouse 
Finance case, "the modern trend among the courts" is to uphold 
agreements for an accord and satisfaction "wherever possible." 
610 P.2d at 1372. In its Marton Remodeling opinion the Court 
observed further that "[t]he law favors compromise in order to 
limit litigation. Accord and satisfaction serves this goal." 
706 P.2d at 610. This Court should further these policies and 
hold that the trial court erred in not holding that there was 
an accord and satisfaction between the parties. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
OFF-SETTING DOWN TIME SUFFERED BY WILLCO IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
In Finding of Fact No. 14, the lower court found: 
"That the defendant failed to prove any offsetting down time." 
Accordingly, the court not only refused to hold that there was 
no accord and satisfaction but that Willco was not entitled to 
any set off as a result of damages Willco incurred because the 
machine did not work as had been represented by MESCO. At the 
trial* Frank Willden testified regarding the problems and 
difficulties that Willco experienced because the machine did 
not work. He stated that one of MESCO's employees, Lonnie 
Yeaman, represented to Mr. Willden during their initial 
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negotiations that the Gerlinger crawler would be well suited to 
Willco's needs on the Kennecott job. Mr. Willden relied on Mr. 
Yeaman's representations. (Tr. 70, 141.) Mr. Willden 
testified that had he known how the machine would actually 
operate, he would never have rented it. (Tr. 141.) He 
testified that the machine was ill-suited for the kind of work 
necessary on the Kennecott job. Moreover, the battery had a 
short in it, which caused continual problems to the machine 
trying to start it. MESCO's president, Del Lewis, testified 
that he was aware of the problems with the battery and he was 
aware that MESCO made a number of service calls to the 
Kennecott job to try to fix the machine. Willco was not 
charged for any of these calls. (Tr. 32-33.) 
As a result of the difficulties experienced with the 
machine, Willco experienced a significant down time on the 
Kennecott job where men and equipment were idle. (Tr. 
143-49.) Mr. Willden testified that the damages suffered by 
Willco as a result of the problems with the machine equaled 
$10,630.00. (Tr. 148-49.) 
There was no evidence to the contrary regarding the 
difficulties experienced by Willco. MESCO's president 
acknowledged that there were problems with the starter and with 
the tracks. The trial court committed error in finding that 
Willco had not proved any off setting down time and in holding 
_ ^ 0 _ 
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that Willco is not entitled to any off sets against the 
judgment. Because the evidence was uncontroverted, the lower 
court committed error in so holding. 
III. 
DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO HOLD THAT 
MESCO WAS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION 
FOR FAILURE TO GIVE THE REQUIRED WRITTEN NOTICE TO WILLCO. 
Each of the Rental Agreements signed by Willco 
(Exhibits 1, 2, and 3) provided: 
DEFAULT: An event of default under this 
agreement shall be nny one of the following: 
(i) a failure of Lessee to pay vlien due any rent 
provided for herein; (ii) any failure of the 
Lessee to perform any other obligation hereunder 
and to remedy such default within tin days after 
written notice thereof fr omJLess o r: (iii ) the 
appointment of a Trustee for Lessee or its 
properties; (iv) an assignment by Lessee for the 
benefit of creditors; (v) the filing of a 
voluntary petition and bankruptcy by Lessee or an 
adjudication of Lessee's bankruptcy in an 
involuntary proceedings; or (vi) any attempt by 
Lessee to remove, sell, encumber, or sublet any 
of the equipment. Upon the occurrence of an 
event of default. Lessor may proceed by 
appropriate legal action to enforce performance 
by Lessee of the terms of this agreement and to 
recover damages for breach of any term 
hereof . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
According to this provision, MESCO was entitled to 
commence legal action against Willco only on "the occurrence of 
an event of default." The only event of default upon which 
MESCO is preceding is the failure to pay for repairs necessary 
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to the equipment, which falls under subparagraph (ii) as "any 
failure of the Lessee to perforin any other obligation hereunder 
and to remedy such default within ten days after written notice 
thereof from Lessor/' There was no evidence at trial that any 
such written notice was given by MESCO to Willco. Having 
failed to give the required written notice under the Rental 
Agreement, MESCO was not entitled to bring legal action against 
Willco. 
On the same grounds, MESCO was not entitled to recover 
any attorneys' fees. The form Rental Agreement states: 
"Lessee shall pay a reasonable sum to reimburse Lessor for its 
costs and expenses (including attorneys' fees, unless 
prohibited by law)." Thus, if MESCO was not entitled to bring 
this action, having failed to give the required notice under 
the Rental Agreement, it is also not entitled to attorneys' 
fees. 
IV. 
MESCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST AT 12 PERCENT PER ANNUM. 
The law of the State of Utah is that prejudgment 
interest is only available on liquidated claims. As this Court 
stated in Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 
1983), "prejudgment interest may be awarded in the case where 
the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the 
.34-
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loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy." W- at 
233. The present case does not fall into this category. 
Additionally, the lower court failed to take into 
account the long delay on the part of MESCO in taking this case 
to trial. The Complaint was filed on or about December 1, 
1982. In order to prepare its case, Willco served 
interrogatories and document requests (R. 37) on MESCO, which 
MESCO failed to answer within the time provided by Rules 33 and 
34. Willco was required to file a Motion to Compel Discovery 
(R. 49), which was granted by Judge Daniels in an Order dated 
April 25, 1984 (R. 62). Thereafter, MESCO continued to delay 
in prosecuting the case and, on November 14, 1985, the trial 
Court, on its own motion issued an Order to Show Cause ordering 
MESCO to appear and show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed. (R. 75.) MESCO did not appear at the hearing on 
the Order to Show Cause, and the Court dismissed the case. (R. 
76.) MESCO subsequently moved the Court to vacate the judgment 
of dismissal, which the Court granted at a hearing on December 
30, 1985- (R. 81.) 
Because of the long delay on the part of MESCO in 
bringing this case to trial, Willco should not be penalized by 
having to pay prejudgment interest. A similar situation arose 
in the case of Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
There, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of 
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prejudgment interest on the grounds that the conduct of the 
parties seeking interest precluded such an award. The Court 
stated that "a substantial number of the delays, in this 
long-pending case were at the instance of or agreed to by the 
defendants." Id. at 1297. Similarly, MESCO was responsible 
for significant delays in the present case, which constituted a 
valid ground for the Lower court to deny an award of 
prejudgment interest. The court abused its discretion by 
assessing prejudgment interest at 12 percent per annum. 
In addition, the lower court awarded prejudgment 
interest against defendant at the rate of 12 percent per annum 
"from the date of the return of the equipment." (R. 138.) 
This holding was contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
15-1-1(1), which provides that, except where the parties have 
entered into a contract for a specific rate of interest, "the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." The 
Rental Agreement signed by Willco did not provide for the 
accrual of interest at a specific rate on outstanding charges 
for repairs. Since the parties did not have a contract, the 
prejudgment interest rate of 10 percent per annum must govern. 
Accordingly, the lower court committed error in awarding 
prejudgment interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum. 
_ o£_ 
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V. 
THE COURT'S RULING THAT MESCO IS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT AGAINST WILLCO IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$8,626.82 WAS UNSUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
A. The lower courts did not find that Willco caused any 
damage to MESCO's machine. 
In Finding of Fact No. 2, the lower court found: 
"That the said leased Gerlinger Crawler was returned by 
defendant to plaintiff on or about March 30, 1982, in a damaged 
condition." The court does not find that the damage was caused 
by Willco. Without such a finding, the court was not justified 
in awarding damages for the value of the repairs against 
Willco. Even if the court were to have found that Willco 
caused the damage, such a finding would not have been supported 
by the evidence. Although there was testimony adduced at the 
trial that the machine was in a damaged condition when it was 
returned by Willco on March 30, 1982. When the machine was 
returned, according to the testimony of Farrell Lewis, who 
testified for MESCO, when the machine was returned, it was 
disassembled and inspected. He testified that it was necessary 
for him to disassemble the machine in order to determine which 
parts needed to be replaced. (Tr. 103, 113.) For example, he 
testified that one of the items that he believed needed to be 
replaced was a track roller, which he testified had been 
subjected to excessive wear. In order to determine the 
condition of the track roller, he needed to disassemble it. 
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Although there was evidence about the condition of the 
machine when it was returned, there was very little evidence 
about its condition before Willco rented the machine, and there 
was no evidence about the condition of parts that required 
disassembly to inspect. Del Lewis was the only witness who 
testified regarding the condition of the machine before Willco 
took possession of it. Although he testified that he did not 
personally inspect the machine (Tr. 16), he did state that he 
had seen the machine before it went to Willco and that it was 
M[b]basically a new machine." (Tr. 18.) 
Del Lewis testified that he had no knowledge of any 
examination of the machine before it went to Willco. (Tr. 
37.) MESCO introduced no evidence at trial regarding any such 
examination. The only evidence regarding the condition of the 
machine was made by Mr. Lewis. He testified that MESCO had two 
crawlers and that he looked at them by walking around them. It 
is clear from his testimony that he did not perform any sort of 
substantive inspection of the machine that went to Willco. He 
stated: 
Q Now, you indicated that you had seen 
the machine prior to its going to Willco; Is that 
right? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember the date? 
A I don't. 
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Q Where was it that you saw it? 
A Well, it was just out in our yard. 
Q Was this before or after you had done 
the demonstrations on it? 
A It would have been after. 
Q But before it went to Willco? 
A Yes. 
Q But you don't know how much time went 
by between the time you looked at it and the time 
it went to Willco? 
A No. 
Q How long did you spend looking at the 
machine at that time? 
A I probably walked by the machine, 
looked at it, and we had two of them, one with 
rippers, and one without rippers. That's really 
the only reason I can remember one machine versus 
the other machine. The one had rippers. The one 
with rippers, we did much more demonstration 
because of the rippers. 
Q The one that went to Willco was the one 
without rippers? 
A That's correct. 
Q You say you walked by it. Did you look 
at both machines? 
A I don't recall whether I paid much 
attention to this one versus this one. All I 
know is the machines were in good repair. 
Q Ifm asking you about the basis for that 
estimate. You can't remember if you actually 
looked at the one that went to Willco as opposed 
to the one with rippers? 
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A No. I don't think I paid any more 
attention to one than the other one. I would 
have walked around and looked at them, possibly 
looked to see how many hours were accumulated on 
the machines, do that every time a machine comes 
in the yard. I would just walk around and kind 
of look at them. I would look to know hours I'm 
getting on my inventory. 
Q At the time that you looked at these 
machines, did you turn them on? 
A No. 
Q Did you look at the undercarriage of 
either of the machines? 
A I would not have climbed underneath to 
look at it, no. 
Q Did you look at the rollers? 
A Not specifically. 
Q Did you look at the bearings? 
A No, I would not have gone out and 
wiggled the tracks or, I mean, I didn't drive 
them. 
Q Was there a muffler system on the 
machine at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you notice whether there were any 
track plates missing? 
A Yes, and there were none. 
Q But you didn't turn the machine on, so 
you donft know what the condition of the track 
was that was underneath? 
A You can look at it from the side and 
see if the track plates are missing. 
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Q Did you look that close? 
A Yes. 
Q You'd look at the bottom to see if 
there were track plates missing? 
A Yes. 
Q You didn't make any notes or documents 
that would reflect what you observed at that 
time, did you? 
A All I was doing was a site [sic] 
inspection. 
(Tr. 41-44; emphasis added.) 
Mr. Lewis further testified that there were between 75 
and 90 hours that had been logged on that machine prior to its 
going to Willco. (Tr. 39.) Matthew Lyman told Frank Willden 
that the machine had been used by other customers. (Tr. 
151-52.) 
Thus, there was no evidence about the state of the 
machine, particularly the state of parts that required 
disassembly before they could be inspected, prior to Willco's 
taking the machine. As a consequence, 6ven though MESCO 
discovered damage to the machine after disassembling it, there 
was no evidence that the damage was in fact caused by Willco. 
Thus, the court committed error in holding that Willco was 
liable for the cost of repairs. 
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B. The trial court committed error in admitting Exhibit 
4 as evidence of the cost to repair the machine. 
The only evidence adduced at trial regarding the value 
of the damages claimed by MESCO was set forth in Repair Order 
No. 1656 (Exhibit 4.) The first and the fourth pages of Repair 
Order No. 1656 were prepared by Farrell Lewis. (Tr. 102-103.) 
He testified that he obtained the prices for the parts listed 
on the first page from a "suggested list price from the 
Gerlinger manufacturing company." (Tr. 103.) No foundation 
was laid for his use of those prices in calculating the value 
of the damage claimed. Counsel for Willco objected to the 
admission of Exhibit 4 on the grounds that it lacked foundation 
and because it violated the hearsay rule. Objection was also 
made on the grounds of lack of relevance because there was no 
evidence that the particular document accurately reflected the 
condition of the machine when it was returned and because there 
was no evidence that there was any inspection done prior to 
Willco*s taking the machine so that it could be certain that 
the inspection done after its return actually reflected damage 
caused by Willco. (Tr. 106.) The exhibit was admitted over 
the objection. (Tr. 107.) 
Moreover, Del Lewis, the president of MESCO, testified 
that Repair Order 1656 was prepared, not by Ferrell Lewis, but 
by another MESCO employee named Randy Hamblin, who inspected 
-A?-
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the machine after it was returned and prepared notes itemizing 
the damage. The Repair Order 1656 was prepared from Randy 
Hamblin's notes, the original of which was thrown away. (Tr. 
122-24.) Accordingly, Repair Order 1656 constituted hearsay, 
relying on other documents not admitted into evidence, namely 
Randy Hamblin's notes and the manufacturers suggested list 
price. No foundation was laid allowing the admissibility of 
Exhibit 1656 under any exception to the hearsay rule. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed error in admitting the 
exhibit over Willcofs objections. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Willco 
respectfully urges this Court to reverse the Judgment on the 
grounds that there was an accord and satisfaction reached 
between Willco and MESCO when MESCO accepted and cashed 
Willcofs paid-in-full check. The accord and satisfaction was 
supported by consideration and is not barred even though Willco 
may have paid what was legitimately owed for the repairs of the 
track and the catalytic converter. Moreover, the necessary 
assent to the accord and satisfaction is implied from MESCOfs 
conduct in accepting Willco's conditional check. According to 
the law as set forth in this Court's prior decisions, nothing 
more is needed to show the necessary assent. 
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The lower court also committed reversible error in not 
dismissing MESCO*s complaint for failure to give the necessary 
written notice to Willco. The court further erred in admitting 
Exhibit 4 and in holding that Willco was liable for $8,626.12, 
when there was insufficient evidence regarding the condition of 
the machine before it went to Willco. 
ADDENDUM 
Defendant-appellant Willco Associates, Inc., has 
appended hereto copies of the following documents: 
1. Rental Agreement No. 0607 dated December 11, 
1981, signed by MESCO and by Willco. (Exhibit 1.) 
2. Rental Agreement, No. 0699 dated March 11, 1982, 
signed by MESCO and by Willco. (Exhibit 3.) 
3. Repair Order No. 1656 and accompanying 
documents. (Exhibit 4.) 
4. Check No. 14614 payable by Willco Associates to 
MESCO in the amount of $2,390.00 dated October 4, 1982. 
(Exhibit 7.) 
5. Repair Order No. 1426 dated March 2, 1982. 
(Exhibit 9.) 
6. Extract from the trial transcript representing 
the Court's ruling from the bench. (Tr. 164-67.) 
7. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed 
May 8, 1986. (R. 136.) 
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8. Judgment, docketed May 9, 1986. (R. 141.) 
DATED this IS day of November, 1986. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
R. Stephen Marshall 
By jl^^Y^^^^^J^^ 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Willco Associates 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief to be hand-delivered 
this t " day of-November, 1986, to the following: 
Boyd M. Fullmer 
2188 Highland Drive 
Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
j^>lWyuJ^ 
3521m 
112686 
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*295 So. Redwood Road 
North Sclt Lake, Utah 84054 
Phone 364-3571 
RENTAL AGREEMENT 
JOS 
LOCATION: 
SWINGER 
OWATONMA 
TRAILKING 
HUDSON 
INVOICE NO. 
/VE75 fi'W/N *i&we5>+ 
QQtoTG , (H^ 
IWiin & ^ ^ J ft L (ft 
0607 
Date /)'<-'//^ Z^ 
J^rk. frCC. Jbh 
/te/yjYC tJ^K^RV^C 
EQUIPMENT RENTED: Lessor hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby hires from Lessor the equipment described be^ow, 
upon the rentals and the terms and conditions contained herein including conditions printed on the reverse side of th:.s agree-
ment *L-
BILLING PERIOD: From PfccW^-fri To: zfe &~^ w V- & 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
C*CX\M\€*- LC-3C f P A ^ C - RentalCharge: ™ \ 1- O O 
-J n A i . u o . , , . / 
rr&r 
Delivery: 
Pick-up-
4 fryi^L \<>L. A * i rk* \2 PCV p^ MriKf »*« 
US'?1(- ^ L > \ l - y \ 7 ( ^ A i V ^ M - w L . . a' t\lc\C-Clean,ng 
C ^ ^ r fi (S, tit ft** ~Gf Misc: 
Sales Tax: QQ. 60 
Date Out iL 
Oate In 
Q-<. / ^ , V Hours on meter 
Hours on meter 
Total to P a y i ^ g ^ ^ g ^ g ^ g t , ^ ^ j f^Q 
Checked Out By 
Checked In By 
NOTE: EQUSPMENT MUST BE CHECKED IN BEFORE LESSEE IS TERMINATED. 
TERM: This lease i$ for a term of . 
RENTAL PAYMENTS: For said term or any portion thereof, Lessee shall pay to Lessor on the following schedule of Rental 
Rates wt.ich do not include drayage, fuel, sjles tax, clearning, or repairs needed due to abuse. 
Basic Truck 
Additional Rental 
Per Hour Attachments 
Fvsmai Period: 
(a) Minimum Rate — 2 Hrs. 
(b) Daily Rats - 8 Hrs. 
<c) Weekly Rate - 4 0 Hrs. 
<d) Monthly Rate - 175 Hrs. 
/CC\ Ot> 
S 
s \xWO A* _ s Ty^tToo 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
i^cs 
RENTAL PAYMENTS: Rental Payments are due and payable in advance for the rental period, except when otherwise arranged 
lor against spprawed credit, in which case payment will be due at end of rental period increment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement this _fL.day of., 
If Lessee i* a corporation, this Agreement is executed by authority of its Board of Directors. 
A .nZL. 
ilESCO^ ACCEPTED: M COU 
-mm^. W /**/*- * mS M 7T (Lessee). 
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r^THof^ict 
295 SO. REDWOOD ROAD 
NORTH SALT LAKE. UTAH 84054 
PHONE 364 3571 
o u r r L. i u u 
OGDENOFFICE 
1760 WALL AVE. 
O'GDEN, UTAH S4404 
PHONE 621-78S1 
. , m u . 
No. 
h j : r j : 4 t b - t r ' . ' . x f H j 
"U»"KE ' .t- :. i. l .ADEi 
A A A *'r P-^:-..CTS A 
AC FS.,-,o;Cl 
H . D S : * . ' - . ' i ^ s 
O J B V - ' • TS 
OA'. •' . ». 7H VOPTA'I 
C J - •' r 
SC'AC- . _ : « N O 
CAV- >=-: A H E . - . - r - , ^ v c , & 
f i r - : , ' - i / , t »••; ' ? » 'ALS 
W R i : - ' i \ - ^ ' - r ; r , . £ 3 P O . t S 
T A ^ L L ' . - • ' . PA V. E P L i ' . ' » - ; . £ 
TOWER ORDER NO. 
r> ORD'D. 
IDATE SHIPPED 
1 
OUR ORDER NO. SHIPPED VIA 
DESCRIPTION 
SALESMAN DATE 
PRICE | 
! 
AMOUNT 
.-.•.' 
T A X 
TOTAL 
AS ALL ORDERS ARE SUBJECT TO CREDIT APPROVAL CASH DISCOUNT OF 2% IF PAID BY THE 10TH OF THE MONTH FOLLOWING PURCHASE ALL ACCOUNTS NO 
WITHIN THIRTY 130) OAYS FROM DUE DATE WILL BE SUBJECT TO A FINANCE CHARGE OF VA% PER MONTH WHICH IS AN ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE OF I E * 
5 ALL FEDERAL STATE OR LOCAL TAXES IN EFFECT AT TIME OF SHIPMENT SHALL BE BORNE BY THE PURCHASER SELLER RETAINS OWNERSHIP OF ALL MAI 
S AND EQUIPMENT UNTIL FINAL PAYMENT IS MADE. BUYER AGREES TO PAY ALL COSTS OF COLLECTION INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE 10« 
LING CHARGE ON ALL RETURNED MERCHANDISE 
VE RECEIVED BY. 
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KOMATSU 
TAKEUCHI 
iVBtiouu 
295 So. Redwood Road 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Phone 364 3571 
SWINGER 
CM ATOMS) A 
TRAILKING 
HUDSON 
2 0599 
LfASED 
73: 
2H RENTAL AGREEMENT 
UKLC / A 
INVOICE NO 
Date ^ Lk 
JOB 
LOCATION: KCC lA 
sy^-ffYo 
Phone No. 
fri-ny tl^X/-y 
EQUIPMENT RENTED: Lessor hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby hires from Lessor the equipment described below, 
tions contaii 
aLkt^— To: 9, 
upori the rentals and the terms and condi ned herein including conditions printed on the reverse side of this acree-
^/Sir^ meat BILLING PERIOD: From 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
LC-Tl/) *M<AjPi**fA^ / ^ ^ J c n t a l Charge: TJj * 
-Ud- T" 2l£iPt Delivery: 
-&-5^-
\TL> <UJIL~ tsfrLlBi^edto ^ 
1 /J '^ '/ii . i- rv^-, 
Pick-up-
tA> 'p^y-vf,—S=L- Cleaning: 
Misc: ^ » i v M ? w . 
Ktfiu+i'L i* iVsJLt is* IP .l~t Sa.'csTftx 
Date Out 
Date I 
IfiVrdt^K A~foUti <h*.>i>~iZ* < Total to Pay: 
/' >jtt IK I 
*K. ->JT 
JL2t£Jf 
Jul f ' '/'i 'f\ 
n ?/#{? 
Hours on meter Checked Out By — -_ 
Hours on meter °'5 Q ^Checked In By ' V <* 
NOTE: EQUIPMENT MUST BE CHECKED IN BEFORE LESSEE IS TERMINATED. 
TERM: This lease is for a term of. 
RENTAL PAYMENTS: For said te/fjr'br any portion thereof, Leit.ee shall pay to Lessor on the following schedu'e of Rertai 
Rates which do not include drayage. fuel, sales tax, cloaming, or repairs needed due to abuse. 
Basic Truck 
Additional Rental 
Per Hour 
Rental Period 
fa) Minimum Rate — 2 Hrs 
(b) Daiiy Rate - 8 Hrs. 
(c) Weekly Rate -40 Hrs. 
Attachments 
S 
S 
s 
id) Monthly Rate - 175 Hrs. S 
S 
S 
?7f.irt>
 s 
s 
$ 
s 
s 
RENTAL PAYMENTS: Rental Payments are due and payable in advance for the rental period, except when otherwise arranged 
for against approved credit, in which case payment will be due at end of rental period increment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement this day of. 
If Lessee i: a corporation, this Agreement is executed by authority of its Board of Directors. 
ACCEPTED: MESCO 
J# -/ r. ^ 
UiLUCd 
t, J , 
19 
(Lessee) 
/ i / i ' t 
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M¥0 EQUIPMENT UNTIL FINAL PAYMENT IS MADE BUYER AGREES TO PAY ALL COSTS OF COLLECTION INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEE 10% 
iG CHARGE ON ALL RETURNED MERCHANDISE 
RECEIVED BY. K 
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M A I N Q h H C t 
29S SO R E D W O C D HOAL) 
N O R T H SALT I A M U T A H 84U!> 
PHONE Jt>4 Jb/1 
-T7«2- )<iHb 
mmmamm^JL 
7 
IlMt eNT 
MAM oi 
i OMI 'MI rjr 
M ' V I ' i f 
<fV-A'm'< /vC 
LL - 3f= 
I N S T R U C T I O N S AMOUNT 
REPAIR ORDER 
IW.II ,5/j> / o - ~ 
N2 1426 
QL'AN PA8I NO 
L 
DldCfflPli'JN 
^ / " ^ Sift^-fr 7ZMK. 
CpcJA/yM/t^ COAJVtXk'l 
AMOUN1 
L'jbWK'AIf [~ ] vNANOi O.i Q 
PlJUslSl*^ /<>/>t/t>* 
A o v \ a A A v t s M ^ V W U , r^vA^Ofy , 
I S . LL ISff 
WS l.^lr \A'H^>^Nl ^ ^ , ik,^,.A\r| ^ \ 
r f d ^ y \ r o ^ ^ M ^ - j j j iiL 
CONDITIONS 
WE PROPOSE TO MAKE THE ABOVE RfPAIRS TO VOU»t EQUIPMENT UNOKR THE 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS HEREINAFTER SPECIFIED 
THE PHlCfSOUOT CO ARE FOR LABOR ONLY AOOITlONAI r .H*H( i fSW!l l HFMADC 
FOR ALL MATERIAL AND PARTS 5.4'PFH.IfO WE WILL M>T ht »<tSH 1NM.H fc n.'M 
LOSS OH DAMAGE TO VOiiR EQUIPMENT OR ITS CONTENTS f'AifSLl) IJY f »R( 
TMtFT ACClOF.NT OR ANY CAUSE OEYOND OUR CUNTROt Y< »uM M.„NAIUIU: 
HEME UNDEH WILL CONSTlTUfE ACCEPTANCE OF IM:$ PROPOSAL 
WO«K 
AUTHOHt/rO BY 
SIGNATURE (I rvrviv acknowledge ihe satisfactory completion 
of the above Ocscni'td work.) 
TOTAL LABOR j> TOTAL MATERIAL ^ 
ACCESSORY 
TO!At AU'i'-SOfiitS 
TIRES & T U * J I ^ 
oAuONSOf-GASi.. 
citAnisof en w 
POUNDS OF GkEASt «i 
f J"VI At / " A C S%u 
.AfaOR I, 
aim &2£ 
'^ay^ORiCSqi |VU£ fV\ aa 
TJRES A TUBES 
^AS Oi l GREASE 
OuTSiDF. WORK 
S'wB TOIAl 
TAX 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fa 
iC".*A"SU 
s»vi^ r>cw 
T R A ^ v N G 
0»VA?0?4.\A jMUSTANG-
295 SO. REDWOOD ROAD 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH 84054 
PHONE 3643571 
' A K E L C M . 
HUDcOS 
TAMiE* 
GE<-. N3EH 
No. 
5MER ORDER N O IOATE SHIPPED 
^F-
OUR ORDER NO. SHIPPED VIA SALESMAN 
• '[•:•} U M 
DATE 
ORD DESCRIPTION PRICE AMOUNT 
| J. . ' ' ' 
j U'.M'V 
I . 
I ' 
I TAX 
TOTAL 
M L ORDERS ARE SUBJECT TO CREDIT APPROVAL CASH DISCOUNT OF 2 \ IF PAID BY THE 10TH OF THE MONTH FOLLOWING PURCHASE A L L ACCOUNTS NOT 
-Mfw T H I R T Y 1301 DAYS FROM DUE DATE WILL BE SUBJECT TO A FINANCE CHARGE OF VA% PER MONTH WHICH IS AN ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE OF 18%. 
Lk FEDERAL. STATE OR LOCAL TAKES IN EFFECT AT TIME OF SHIPMENT SHALL BE BORNE BY THE PURCHASER SELLER RETAINS OWNERSHIP OF ALL MAT-
NO EQUIPMENT UttTlL f lNAL PAYMENT IS MADE BUYER AGREES TO PAY ALL COSTS OF COLLECTION INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY S FEE 10% 
'j CHARGE ON ALL *£JLf*t4tD MERCHANDISE 
(ECEIVEOB 
.X 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
SUBMIT THEM TO THE COURT. 
THE COURT: I F YOU WILL DO THAT. 
MR. MARSHALL: OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MAYBE 
4 j F I L E A B R I E F , AS THE COURT L I K E S . 
! 
5 | THE COURT: I WOULD L IKE TO HAVE YOU GIVE 
i 
6 j ME THE COPIES OF THE CASES I F YOU HAVE THEM NOW. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. MARSHALL: I HAVE A COPY FOR COUNSEL 
AS WELL. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, GENTLEMEN, STAY IN 
THE AREA. 
11 < COURT WILL BE IN RECESS, AND THEN I WILL 
12 
13 
14 
I 
I 
I 15
 I 
I 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
HAVE MY R U L I N G . 
( A RECESS WAS TAKEN. ) 
THE COURT: I HAVE NOW, GENTLEMEN, REVIEWED 
THE F I L E , THE E X H I B I T S , AS WELL AS THE AUTHORITIES 
PROVIDED ME BY MR. MARSHALL, AND MY JUDGMENT IS AS 
FOLLOWS: I N THIS CASE, THE P L A I N T I F F SUED FOR 
MONIES CLAIMED OWING FOR REPAIRS TO RENTAL EQUIPMENT. 
THE DEFENDANT ALLEGES THE EQUIPMENT F A I L E D , AND 
FURTHER THAT AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS REACHED, 
AND FURTHER THAT I F NO ACCORD AND.SATISFACTI ON WAS 
REACHED, THE DEFENDANT HAD OFFSETS FOR DOWN TIME 
WHICH EXCEEDED THE CLAIMS OF THE P L A I N T I F F . 
THE DEFENDANT RENTED CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT 
FROM THE P L A I N T I F F COMMENCING ON THE 11TH OF 
164 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE. SUITE 712 
C i l T I X W C r i T V I I T l U I i l l l 
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1 ! DECEMBER OF 1 9 8 1 THROUGH THE 11TH OF MARCH OF 1982 
2 PER THE RENTAL AGREEMENTS, EXHIBITS 1 , 2 , 3 , AND 8 . 
3 THE FORM RENTAL AGREEMENTS PROVIDE THE LESSEE WILL BE ! 
4 : RESPONSIBLE FOR REPAIRS TO THE RENTAL EQUIPMENT. 
5 THE LEASED EQUIPMENT WAS RETURNED ON THE 
6 30TH OF MARCH OF 1982 WITH CLAIMED DAMAGES AS SET ! 
7 FORTH IN EXHIBIT *• TOTALING $ 8 , 6 2 6 . 8 2 . 
8 EXHIBIT 3 , THE RENTAL AGREEMENT OF MARCH 1 1 , 
9 i 1 9 8 2 , THE LAST RENTAL AGREEMENT HAD THE ADDITIONAL j 
1 0 I HANDWRITTEN NOTATION AS FOLLOWS: "REPAIRS TO BE MADE 
i n WILL BE BILLED OUT ON SEPARATE INVOICE," WHICH 
1 2 DOCUMENT WAS SIGNED BY FRANK WILDEN ON BEHALF OF THE 
1 3 DEFENDANT. 
1 4 EXHIBIT 9 , INVOICE 1^26 OF MARCH 2 , 1 9 8 2 , 
1 5 CHARGES THE SUM OF $ 2 3 9 0 . 0 6 FOR REPAIRS TO THE 
1 6 : EQUIPMENT FOR TRACK AND CATALYTIC CONVERTER. THIS 
1 7 INVOICE WENT UNPAID UNTIL THE *<TH OF OCTOBER OF 1982 
18 AT WHICH TIME IT WAS PAID BY CHECK WITH LIMITING OR 
19 '' CONDITIONAL LANGUAGE, WHICH IS EXHIBIT 7 . THIS SUM 
20 BORE INTEREST AT THE SPECIFIED RATE, AND BY THE DATE 
2 1 OF PAYMENT, HAD ACCUMULATED INTEREST AS EVIDENCED BY 
22 ! EXHIBIT 1 0 . 
23 ; AS COUNSEL ARE AWARE, TO ESTABLISH ACCORD 
24 ; AND SATISFACTION, FOUR CONDITIONS MUST BE MET. 
25 ? NUMBER ONE, THERE MUST BE A PROPER SUBJECT MATTER. 
s 
i 
j 165 
< 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 ! NUMBER TWO, THERE MUST BE COMPETENT PARTIES. NUMBER 
2 ! THREE, AN ASSENT OR MEETING OF THE MINDS IS REQUIRED 
3 j NUMBER FOUR, CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN FOR THE 
4 | ACCORD. I F , HOWEVER, THE UNDERLYING CLAIM IS 
5 j L IQU IDATED OR S P E C I F I C IN AMOUNT, SEPARATE 
6 ! CONSIDERATION OTHER THAN PAYING THE AMOUNT OWED MUST 
7 J BE FOUND. OTHERWISE, THE OBLIGOR BINDS HIMSELF TO 
8 j DO NOTHING HE IS NOT ALREADY OBLIGATED TO DO. 
9 T H I S IS SET FORTH BY THE SUPREME COURT IN 
1 0 I THE CASE OF SUGARHOUSE FINANCE VERSUS ANDERSON, 
H I 610 P . 2 D 1 3 6 9 , A 1980 CASE. 
i 
12 | THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, IN MY JUDGMENT, 
1 3 j HAS ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE THAT THE 
I 
14 | EQUIPMENT WAS DAMAGED AND THAT THE DEFENDANT IS 
i 
15 ! RESPONSIBLE TO PAY SAID SUMS. THERE IS NO SEPARATE 
1 6 ! CONSIDERATION FOR AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WITH 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
REGARD TO THE FINAL REPAIR B I L L , EXHIBIT k. NEITHER 
AM I PERSUADED THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE M I N D S . 
THEREFORE, I FIND THAT NO ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION WAS EXTANT. NEITHER AM I PERSUADED THAT 
THERE WAS OFFSETTING DOWN T I M E . THE DEFENDANT 
CONTINUED TO RENT THE MACHINE EVEN AS OF THE 2ND OF 
MARCH OF 1 9 8 2 , AT WHICH TIME HE SIGNED ANOTHER FORM 
RENTAL AGREEMENT AND ACCEPTED THE EQUIPMENT. THAT'S 
E X H I B I T 3 . 
166 
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1 I JUDGMENT, THEREFORE, IS AWARDED TO THE 
» 
i 
2 ! PLAINTIFF FOR THE SUM OF $8,626.82 PLUS INTEREST AT 
3 J 18 PERCENT PER ANNUM AND A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1875 PLUS COSTS OF THIS ACTION. 
5 j MR. FULLMER, YOU PREPARE THE FINDINGS OF 
6 I FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT. SUBMIT THEM 
i 
7 i TO MR. MARSHALL FOR HIS APPROVAL AS TO FORM. 
i 
e j MR. FULLMER: THANK YOU. 
9 
10 
i 
{ 
» I 
i 
12 ; 
13 ; 
14 '• 
«l 
I 
16 ! 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
167 
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BOYD M. FULLMER, #1138 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2188 Highland Drive 
201 Dixon Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 486-0805 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAK^' COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLCO ASSOCIATESr INC., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C82-9803 
Judge Frederick 
The foregoing matter having come on regularly before the Court 
for trial on the 5th day of March, 1986, with the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge presiding, and Boyd M. Fullmer appearing for the 
plaintiff and R. Steven Marshall appearing for the defendant and 
Frank Wilden, the president of the defendant appearing and testifying 
and Del Lewis, the president of the plaintiff appearing and testify-
ing and Farrell Lewis and Matt Lyman respectively an employee and 
former employee of the plaintiff also having testified, and the 
exhibits having been testified on and introduced into evidence and 
the court having fully heard the evidence and being fully advised of 
the facts, and defendant having objected to the Findings of Fact and 
the form the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, and said objections 
having been resolved before the Court under hearing date of April 28, 
1986, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
1. That defendant leased a Gerlinger LC-30 Crawler from the 
plaintiff for a term from December 11, 1981 to March 30, 1982. 
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2. That the said leased Gerlinger Crawler was returned by 
defendant to plaintiff on or about March 30, 1982, in a damaged 
condition. 
3. That additional information was written on or about March 30, 
1982, on the last line of a lease document. That the billing was for 
two weeks and three days and that repairs to be made would be billed 
out on a separate invoice. 
4. That the reason for the filling out of repairs to be made 
to be on a separate invoice was that the equipment was inspected 
upon its return and determined to be in a damaged condition. 
5. That each of said lease contracts was signed by an 
authorized officer of the defendant. 
6. That the standard printed terminology on each form makes 
the defendant/lessee responsible for repairs to the equipment. 
7. That the defendant had the plaintiff make certain repairs 
to the equipment of a value of $2,390.06 for repairs necessary 
while the equipment was in use during one of the least times. 
8. That the defendant submitted to the plaintiff a check 
with restrictive endorsements claiming full settlement and claim-
ing an oral accord and satisfaction, which check was cashed by the 
plaintiff. 
9- That the Court does not find an accord and satisfaction. 
10* The Court does not find that the defendant did anything 
more than the defendant was obligated to do as he paid the balance 
due and owing on that invoice. 
11 • That the cost to repair the equipment was $8,626.82. 
12, That in accordance with the Stipulation of the parties 
a reasonable attorneyfs fee is $1,875.00, and the contract has 
provision for the reasonable attorney's fee. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13. That interest is awarded at the rate of 12% per annum. 
14. That the defendant failed to prove any offsetting down 
tine. 
15. That there was no separate consideration for the claimed 
accord and satisfaction. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant 
in the sum of $8,626.82. 
2. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment for attorney's fees 
against the defendant in the sum of $1,875.00. 
3. That the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendant for his costs and plaintiff shall file his separate 
cost bill. 
4. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendant for interest in the sum of 12% per annum from the date of the 
return of the equipment. 
5. That the defendant is not entitled to any offsets against 
said judgment, 
DATED in open Court this 9f-#"~day of
 A [f\ 9)J , 1986. «^da ^ ~7fi if/
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
„ l/M 
JUDfly J . DEW ERICK 
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
ATTEST 
H. pJXQN HINDLEY 
Ctorit 
Deputy Oterk 
BOYD M. FULLMER 
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BOYD M. FULLMER, #1138 , 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
201 Dixon Building 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 486-0805 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 'LAKE'COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
WILLCO ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendant. 
04 , *e c- At,. $f^ 
; .r-? ji . 1-.ft• ai^ 
: JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. C82-9803 
: Judge Frederick 
The foregoing matter having come on regularly for trial before 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, one of the Judges of the above-
entitled Court on the 5th day of xMarch, 1986, and Boyd M. Fullmer 
appearing for the plaintiff, and R. Steven Marshall appearing for 
the defendant, and the witnesses having appeared and testified and 
the exhibits having been admitted and testified on and the Court 
having been fully advised in the facts and the law and made Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions thereon, and defendant having filed his 
objections and those objections having been resolved before the Court 
on a hearing of April 28, 1986, and it being a proper matter, it is 
hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff have judgment against the defendant in the 
sum of $8,626.82. 
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2. That plaintiff have judgment against defendant for interest 
in the sum of 12% per annum from the date of return of the equipment 
of March 30, 1932, in the sum of $4,226.74. 
3. That plaintiff is entitled to interest on this judgment 
at the rate of 12% per annum. 
4. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendant for a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of $1,875.00, 
and for costs. 
5. That defendant is not entitled to any offsetting amounts. 
DATED in open Court this & 
APPROVED AS TO F0R.M: 
BOYD M. FULLMER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
day o f May, 1986 . 
WwJA 
r. ifENN: 
X> / 
ATTES 
JUD£E J.^B IS FREDERICK 
Dtpjty C'.erk 
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
Attorney for Defendant 
-2-
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